This paper reports a computational model of Boole's discovery of Logic as a part of Mathematics. George Boole (1815Boole ( -1864 found that the symbols of Logic behaved as algebraic symbols, and he then rebuilt the whole contemporary theory of Logic by the use of methods such as the solution of algebraic equations. Study of the di erent historical factors that in uenced this achievement has served as background for our two main contributions: a computational representation of Boole's Logic before it was mathematized; and a production system, BOOLE2, that rediscovers Logic as a science that behaves exactly as a branch of Mathematics, and that thus validates to some extent the historical explanation. The system's discovery methods are found to be general enough to handle three other cases: two versions of a Geometry due to a contemporary of Boole, and a small subset of the Di erential Calculus.
Introduction
In 1847, George Boole found that, by adequately representing Logic, it became a branch of Algebra in a precise sense: all known results in Logic (and some unknown) could be obtained by the use of standard mathematical techniques. Our objective has been to provide a coherent detailed account of this surprising discovery, both from the historical and the computational point of view. Boole's discovery was surprising because even though there had been attempts to mathematize Logic, nobody had reached a full formalization, presumably because no one regarded Logic from a strict mathematical point of view and applied genuine mathematical tools, as Boole did (see Section 2.2).
We have studied how, plausibly, Boole arrived at his knowledge of the Method of Separation of Symbols (MSS). This was the contemporary name for a method which is a precursor of today's abstract mathematical formalization. Also, we have studied how Boole extensively used the method in several branches of Calculus and Probability. The practice of applying the method had been and remained common among some mathematicians of the 18th and 19th centuries, both on the Continent and in the U.K., but always within recognized branches of Mathematics (see Section 2).
We concluded that Boole's discovery in Logic was just one more application of the method, but this time to a non mathematical discipline: Logic. Our next step was to devise a computational representation of Logic as it was presented in Boole's Logic writings, in order to write a program that could discover the algebraic character of Logic by examining it under viewpoint of the MSS.
Two facts were crucial for G. Boole's discovery: (i) First, the change in representation from a philosophical view of Logic as an enormous complex structure of syllogisms and conditional statements, to a view of it as (possibly) tting the general scheme for any branch of Algebra. Simplistically, the scheme consists of a set of very simple objects that are subjected to operations on numbers.
(ii) The second fact was the successful application of the MSS to Logic, which meant that some (interesting) subset of properties of the operations on numbers held also for Logic. This made it possible to use the powerful tools of Mathematics on this new domain of Logic.
Our work on representation is based on fact (i). In all his Logic texts, G. Boole provided descriptions in terms that were susceptible to the MSS (see the remark below, and Sections 2.2 and 5.4). We have tried to model this part of the history by designing a representation which is given as input to a computational system which we named boole (see Sections 4, and 5.4) . The system execution applies the method to nd that Logic is actually a branch of Algebra.
The rst version of the boole system dealt with the task in fact (ii) above (applying MSS to Logic). It is a frame-based production system whose productions, the successive states of its working memory, and its outputs are supposed to follow Boole's account of his discovery as revealed by his writings on Logic and the writings about him by his contemporaries. See, for instance, the Memoir of Augustus De Morgan 10] , Home Side of a Scienti c Mind 12] , or Boole's rst biography 16] .
But the whole of Boole's writings (on Logic as well as on Mathematics) provides another idea that motivated the following step in our work. In Boole's view, the process of nding whether the MSS successfully applies to a branch of science is always the same (see, for instance, 21]). We have exploited this idea in the design of boole2, which incorporates the features of the previous version that refer to the MSS; this is the generic part of the system. However, boole2 can deal not only with Logic, but with other branches of science. Currently, it handles Logic, two di erent versions of a subset of Geometry that was proposed by a contemporary of Boole (see the remark below), and the rst principles of Di erential Calculus. The result is that properties similar to those in Logic hold for the rst version of Geometry and the Calculus, although not for the second version of Geometry because of a non-commutativity. Thus, boole2 reasons from the input representation of a science and veri es that some properties hold or not hold in that science (see Section 3).
This work can be summarized as follows. We construe the historical discovery of the algebraic nature of Logic as the sum of two sudden changes. The rst one is the representation of Logic. The second is the application of the MSS. boole2 is designed to follow the ideas expressed in G. Boole's writings. We have tried to make the system reproduce not only the result of the discovery, but also Boole's account of the process that led to it, and so boole2 reasons in a linguistic way to reproduce the historical discovery in Logic. Other discoveries are reached also by trying to parallel Boole's results in several branches of Mathematics. boole2 constitutes a computational explanation of the discovery in Logic, and opens a path for the study of discoveries in abstract sciences such as Mathematics or Logic.
Remarks
In this paper, the terms symbolize and symbolization are equivalent to formalize and formalization in the sense of verifying that a science subject matter is an instance of some formal system. We use symbolize rather than formalize in order to follow Boole, whose writings employ phrases such as \the use of symbols", \symbolic expression", \algebra of symbols", \symbolic language", \let us use the symbols", or \the symbolical forms : : : are su cient for the basis of a Calculus". Also, the terms operation and combination depart here from common usage, because we wish to re ect the conception of sciences in Boole's time. Thus, an operation means something close to the modern idea of operator. For instance, di erentiation is an operation of Calculus; taking the trace of a point moving through a segment is an operation of Geometry (\transference"); and selecting a class of individuals from a universe is an operation of Logic (\class"). The e ects of the operations in these three examples are the well known concepts of derivative, segment, and predicate (identi ed with a set of individuals). On the other hand, we use the term combination (of operations) much in the sense of today's algebraic operation. For instance, in Logic two successive acts of selecting individuals rst from class x and then from class y (\class succession") yield the class of the individuals which are both x and y. Similarly, in Geometry the trace of a point subjected to two movements through two di erent directions is a parallelogram. 1 Finally, two successive di erentiations yield a second derivative. 2 The actual historic discovery
Boole was an able developer of a methodological tradition begun in France during the second half of the 18th century, and continued in Britain during the rst half of the 19th century. Arbogast, Lagrange and others worked in France 11, chapter 2]. Murphy, Greatheed, John Hershel and others were British mathematicians who used the method 30], but in our opinion it was Duncan F. Gregory who more clearly expressed the philosophy of the method, and Boole who developed it most fully ( 21, 6] ). This tradition involved the methodological idea of separating symbols of operations from their subjects of application, and operating with these symbols as with algebraic entities. The method was called the Method of Separation of Symbols (MSS) and it was at the heart of Boole's discovery and development of Logic as an algebraic discipline.
An example of the Application of the Method of Separation of Symbols
An example from one of Gregory's articles 13] serves to illustrate the MSS: Gregory determines the symbolic laws used in Newton's binomial, (a + b) n = a n + na n?1 b + n(n ? 1) 1 2 a n?2 b 2 + : : : + b n and notes that according to Euler only the following three laws of combination of symbols are necessary for the general application of the binomial development:
Commutative law: ab = ba Distributive law: c(a + b) = ca + cb Index law: a m a n = a m+n Therefore, the development of the binomial, which in principle refers to numbers, is valid when the symbols a; b; n in (a + b) n represent other entities, provided they ful ll these three laws. Gregory states that since it can be proved that the operations of Di erential Calculus and of the Calculus of Finite Differences are subject to these laws, it can be assumed that Newton's binomial development is valid for such Calculi, which means that it is not necessary to repeat the proof for each particular case. Let us consider an example application from Gregory's article: the determination of the nth derivative of a product of functions u v. The known equality: ...these operations, from their nature, are distributive and, as they are independent of each other, they must be commutative, hence they come under the circumstances to which the binomial theorem applies.
So, the nth derivative may be considered as a power, the result being: Gregory says that the result is also valid when n is fractional or negative. Thus, Gregory "separates" the symbols for derivatives from the subjects of application of those derivatives, and operates with the former as with algebraic entities, applying to them Newton's binomial formula in this particular case.
Even though Gregory's contribution to the method is usually recognized as substantial, only Boole dared to try it on a previously non mathematical discipline: Logic. The historical and detailed explanation of this process has been a substantial part of our research, which this Section 2 brie y summarizes. We then introduce a program that works according to our reconstruction of Boole's discovery.
The historical development of the method has been studied in 19, 18, 30] That which renders Logic possible, is the existence in our minds of general notions,-our ability to conceive of a class, and to designate its individual members by a common name. The theory of Logic is thus intimately connected with that of Language. A successful attempt to express logical propositions by symbols, the laws of whose combinations should be founded upon the laws of the mental processes which they represent, would, so far, be a step toward a philosophical language... 3, pp. [4] [5] .
Thus, Logic is a language with signs and rules for combining signs. The mind forms the idea of a class, to which a name (a label or a sign) is given. Once signs have been assigned to classes belonging to a universe of discourse, the necessary next step is to determine the laws which the signs follow. These laws are found by investigating the mental processes which carry out these acts of classi cation. 2 The goal of determining laws then led to the discovery of Mathematical Logic, which Boole formulated in The Mathematical Analysis of Logic 3] as follows:
Further, let us conceive a class of symbols x; y; z; possessed of the following character. The symbol x, operating upon any subject comprehending individuals or classes, shall be supposed to select from that subject all the X's individuals of some class] which it contains... When no subject is expressed, we shall suppose 1 (The Universe) to be the subject understood, so that we shall have x = x(1). ...the product xy will represent, in succession, the selection of the class Y, and the selection from the class Y of such individuals of the class X as are contained in it, the result being the class whose members are both X's and Y's... The result of an act of election is independent of the grouping or classi cation of the subject. Thus it is indi erent whether from a group of objects considered as a whole, we select the class X, or whether we divide the group into two parts, select the X's from them separately, and then connect the results in one aggregate conception. We may express this law mathematically by the equation x(u + v) = xu + xv... It is indi erent in what order two successive acts of election are performed... The symbolic expression of this law is xy = yx. The result of a given act of election performed twice or any number of times in succession is the result of the same act performed once... supposing the same operation to be n times performed, we have x n = x... (These) laws are su cient for the basis of a calculus. From the rst of these it appears that elective symbols are distributive, from the second that they are commutative; properties which they possess in common with symbols of quantity, and in virtue of which, all the processes of common algebra are applicable to the present system... The third law x n = x we shall denominate the index law. It is peculiar to elective symbols and will be found of great importance... This quotation explains that Logic is a calculus governed by algebraic laws (distributive, commutative, and index), which is the starting point for the use of the MSS. Boole's entire book 3] completely develops an Algebraic Logic based on precisely those three laws. This special Algebra is elementary, its main procedure being the solution of systems of algebraic equations. However, it is powerful: it even surpasses somewhat the level of Boole's contemporary Logic (G. Boole proved the existence of combinations of premises in which there is absolutely no medium of comparison). Also, his Algebra should not be confused with Boolean Algebra, a di erent discipline, built up by Jevons, Peirce, Venn, and others after Boole's death.
Boole's discovery was the realization that Logic is a science amenable to symbolization, meaning that its basic operations follow the same laws of combination of symbols as some of the families in Symbolic Algebra.
3 Overview of boole2
Our rst program boole1 succeeded in applying the MSS to Logic, and it reached the same conclusions as G. Boole at the beginning of his Mathematical Analysis of Logic 7] .
Since we believed that -in Boole's view-ascertaining whether a science is symbolizable (whether the MSS is applicable to it) is always the same, we undertook the task of generalizing boole1's heuristics to make the program applicable to other sciences as well. Duncan F. Gregory's Geometry 3 was chosen as a rst test case.
We emphasize that, even though the system does not currently handle a large number of case studies, it does capture an interesting level of detail for several, and it is potentially able to handle further cases. The separation-of-symbols heuristic has been consistently used since the 19th century under the name of formalization or abstraction. Whenever a portion of knowledge is symbolically represented and its symbols (separated from the particular meaning they have in their domain) are found to behave in the same way as those of, say, Logic, Algebra, Graph Theory, etc., a separation-of-symbols process has been carried out. In this sense, any science could be a candidate input for the system. There would always be an output, it is or is not symbolizable, if we could devise an appropriate representation of the science. Due to their low degree of formalization, Boole's contemporary sciences are more suitable than others to the spirit of the present study.
Our subsequent version, boole2, uses a uniform and plausibly humanoid way of representing and reasoning and is able to discover that Logic, Geometry, and a subset of Di erential Calculus are symbolizable 8], and that the generalization of Gregory's Geometry is not symbolizable because of its lack of commutativity. boole2's representation and reasoning tools are intended to handle any science as a candidate for symbolization, provided its basic contents can be made accessible to the system. The generic part of the system concerns the MSS and is designed to receive some speci c science as input: operations, combinations and the possible laws thereof. Thus the system becomes applicable to domains besides Logic.
For simplicity of exposition, most examples in this paper are drawn from Logic, but there are parallel examples in the other domains that boole2 has handled.
boole2's starting point is the knowledge and goals prior to the discovery of a science being symbolizable or not, and it decides whether the discovered laws allow incorporating the science to the set of symbolizable sciences. The input is a description of a science in terms of its operations and combinations; the output is a record of its algebraic properties and whether it is symbolizable. Figure 1 is a formalized depiction of the discovery task.
Given: A science in terms of: Check whether a combination ful lls a law Heuristics: a set of techniques used by a human agent in a discovery process. For instance, when a combination has been performed with operations o1 and o2, try to perform the same combination with o2 and o1 to test for commutativity. Or, in a di erent context, when two mathematical expressions are tested for equality, try a factoring process.
Ful lling the initial goal depends on reaching a number of subgoals, that in turn need other subgoals, and so on. The achievement of each goal simulates one step of the discovery process. Figure 2 shows the top part of the subgoaling structure of boole2's reasoning. 4 This heuristic-guided backward process is an interpretation of the seemingly insightful reasoning method of Boole.
Incorporate science, if possible, to symbolization and record laws
Test whether a science is symbolizable Fig. 2 . Top part of the subgoaling structure generated by boole2 when reasoning.
For example, the initial state in the case of Logic is:
Set of simple operations: there is only one simple operation, called logicclass. Initially, three instances of this concept are generated: x; y; and z, which describe three simple generic operations in Logic. Each one represents the generic act of election idea of G. Boole expressed in the quotation of Section 2.2. Set of combinations: succession and aggregation, which are also described in Section 2.2 and correspond roughly to conjunction and disjunction in classical logics.
Representation in boole2
A key issue in boole2 is representing the input science. Most aspects are described in this section, but there are also science-dependent procedures and heuristics which are described below in Section 5. We have chosen a frame-based representation for concepts and a production system for actions, both implemented using a frame-based tool for generating production systems, frulekit 31] . Figure 3 shows, as an example, an overview of the frames hierarchy for the science Logic.
The hierarchy of frames has three parts: (a) static science-independent, (b) static science-dependent, and (c) dynamic. The static science-independent part is common to all sciences; its frames correspond to generic descriptions of concepts, without implying that every science will possess an instance of every frame. The static science-dependent part is speci c to a science, but also consists of frames and instances that are created before execution of the production system. Finally, the dynamic instances are created by the production system. The next subsections discuss how to represent operations and combinations. 
Representing operations
The operations of any science are de ned in terms of subclasses of a prede ned frame called simple-operation. In Logic, the subclass of simple-operation is the simple operation logic-class. Similarly, in Geometry there is transference, and in Calculus, (partial) differentiation. Figure 4 shows the de nition of this frame and its slots. The rst two slots are self-explanatory. The slot notation describes a linguistic representation of the operation that parallels the name of the operation. The notation is explained in detail in Section 4.2.2.
Besides inheriting all slots from their respective superclasses, all subclasses of the hierarchy can de ne new local slots. For instance, the frame transference inherits the slots of simple-operation and de nes two new ones, as shown in Figure 5 . Initially, generic examples of the simple operation of the science are generated.
Frame transference is-a simple-operation Slot Comments magnitude number of dimensions of the transference direction directions of the transference Also, for each science, the so-called result operations (e.g., result-class in Logic, and result-transference in Geometry) are de ned as simple operations. Result operations are used to represent the outcome of combining two simple operations, unlike the other simple operations which are de ned at the initial state.
Representing combinations
The second input to boole2 is the combinations for a given science. Combinations require more representation features, since one must describe what the system should do when combining two operations (application of the rst operator of the problem space). The static character of combinations (what they are) is de ned by the frames, whereas the dynamic character (what they do) is de ned in terms of rules and functions. Figure 6 shows the static de nition of the frame combination. The arithmeticname is the name that the combination will receive in Algebra, once the system discovers that the corresponding science can be symbolized, and, therefore, that its formulae can be translated into Algebra and transformed using algebraic tools. The allowed slot values are times and plus. For each science, two subclasses of this frame are de ned:
De nition of combinations
prototype-combination. Represents the combinations themselves; its de nition is in Figure 7 . For example, in Logic the two instances of the frame prototype-combination have values for the slot name of succession and aggregation, respectively. The generator slots refer to how the combination applies to two operations (how it works); they are explained in Section 4.2.2. The system lls the slot laws when discovering laws that the combination ful lls. combination-instance. Represents the successive applications of a combination to di erent pairs of operations. For example, if boole2 performs in Logic the succession of x and y, it generates an instance of the frame result-class, and an instance of the frame combination-instance that represents the application of this combination. Among other things, this allows the program to easily avoid repeating the combination on the same pair of operations in the same order. Figure 8 shows the description of the frame. The slots simple-operation* represent the operations that were combined in the corresponding instance of the combination. The value of the slot result is the notation that results from applying the combination. Section 4.2.2 explains this in more detail.
Frame combination-instance is-a combination Slot Comments simple-operation1 the rst simple-operation that is combined simple-operation2 the second simple-operation that is combined simple-operation3 sometimes there is a third optional operation result result of combining two simple-operations Fig. 8 . Representation of the frame combination-instance.
De nition of notations
One must also de ne how the combinations of a science can be computed. The notations described by G. Boole and D. Gregory for Logic and Geometry, and the opening chapters of Calculus textbooks, motivated our representation of their respective operations and combinations. For instance, based on G.
Boole's description of performing the two combinations of Logic, we generated a set of notations in English which are similar, both in form and meaning, to Boole's own sentences. Thus, to perform a combination, two functions need to be de ned to describe the notations of operations:
Notations for representing the input operations (notation-generator).
We describe here only the notations generated for succession in Logic, but equivalent work has been done for aggregation and for combinations in Geometry and Calculus. Figure 9 shows the output of the notation generator function when applying succession to two operations in Logic.
Function Succession-Notation-Generator(operation1,operation2) name1:=operation-name(operation1); name2:=operation-name(operation2); If operation2 is a result-class Then Return simple-operation-notation(operation2) Else If name1=name2 Then Return ((ALL THAT ARE name1)) Else Return ((name2 THAT ARE name1) (name2 THAT ARE NOT name1)) For example, suppose boole2 applies succession to the operations x and y. It calls the function Succession-Notation-Generator with the frames representing x and y (instances of logic-class) as arguments. Since the frame for y is not an instance of result-class, and since x and y are not the same, the function generates the following notation for 
De nition of rules for the combinations
boole2 needs production rules to actually compute the combinations. These rules implement the operator \apply a combination to two operations" of the problem space as de ned in Section 3. The operator variables to be instantiated are: combination, operation1, and operation2. The combination rules are all very similar. The left-hand side nds two operations (initial or the result of a previous combination) and a combination, such that the combination has not yet been applied to the two operations in this order. The right-hand side generates notations for the operations and the result, and de nes two new instances: the corresponding result-* frame (the * stands for the simple-operation of the science involved), and a combination-instance frame. Figure 11 illustrates the succession of two classes in Logic. Create a new instance of result-class with: notation=r Fig. 11 . Rule that performs the succession of two operations in Logic.
5 boole2 as a production system boole2 is a production system with three classical components: working memory, rule set, and control. Its generic knowledge consists of a set of rules and frame descriptions common to any science, while its speci c knowledge is composed of a set of rules and frame descriptions for each particular science. This partition into generic and speci c is advantageous, since it allows creating a discoverer for each science, given the inputs for that science. Figure 12 shows the system architecture. The initial facts in working memory describe the input science prior to any test of its algebraic character. The intermediate and nal states represent the plausible mental states of the scientist during his or her reasoning. The generic production rules determine whether a given science can be symbolized or not, while the speci c rules describe how to perform combinations in the science. The control mechanism guides boole2 towards the same kind of reasoning that is found in G. Boole's writings. Even though the science-speci c knowledge is contained in boole2, conceptually it has the role of an input.
Working memory in boole2 consists of a set of frame descriptions and a set of frame instances. For example, Figure 3 shows the hierarchy of frames in Logic.
Working memory was already discussed in Section 4. The next two sections describe the production rules and control.
Rule set
The rules can be classi ed into the following groups:
Recording rules. These collect all laws that are found to hold in a given science.
General rules. These control the abstract reasoning for considering a science symbolizable. They are all science independent since they embody knowledge of the MSS. For instance, Figure 13 shows an example of the rule that states whether a science is symbolizable or not. It tests whether there are two combinations that are each commutative and jointly distribute. If so, it concludes that the science can be symbolized, and it renames the combinations with their respective algebraic (arithmetic) names: times and plus. The renaming will allow a future system (under development) to operate with any symbolizable science in the algebraic problem space. Law rules. These check the common laws for the sciences, such as commutativity, distributivity, idempotence, and index-idempotence. When a law rule res, the system creates an instance of the frame corresponding to that law (see Figure 3 , part c), which asserts that the given combination ful lls the law.
Other rules discover that a given combination does not ful ll a law, as in the case of the Generalized Geometry. The law rules are science-independent, except for the equality of notations test, which we discuss below. For example, the rule that tests commutativity looks for one combination-instance, the result r of applying a combination n to operations op1 and op2, and another combination-instance, the result r1 of applying n to the same combinations in reverse order, such that r1 is equal to r.
The science-dependent boolean function equal-notation returns True if two notations are equal in the given science. For instance, in Logic, the function equal-notation returns True if: { The two notations are identical, or { The di erence between the sets notation1 and notation2 is empty. The difference is computed by removing notation elements that are equal. Two notation elements, n 1 and n 2 , are equal if they are identical (n 1 = n 2 ), or if the rst element of n 1 equals the last element of n 2 , the rst element of n 2 equals the last element of n 1 , and NOT does not appear in either of the notation elements. Combination rules. These science-dependent rules perform combinations over the operations of a science; these rules were already described in Section 4.2.3.
Forced combination rules. These science-dependent rules act as problem space heuristics by selecting which combination of two operations should be tried. These rules peform the combination, they do not just cede control to a combination rule. For example, in Logic the heuristic rule forced-succession guides the system to combine the two operations o2 and o1, if it already has performed the opposite combination of o1 and o2. If the results of both combinations are the same, the commutativity rule will then re. This is human-like reasoning which G. Boole employed in his writings. Moreover, this is the likely way that one would try to prove that a given combination is commutative.
Continuation rules. These heuristic rules lead to uniformly applying the combinations. They prevent using the same combination twice in a row when other combinations can be applied instead, by giving priority to rules that did not re during the last cycle.
Control mechanism
Execution is controlled by means of an agenda mechanism. Rules are organized in six priority levels with the more abstract rules at higher priority, and the more detailed rules at lower priority. In order of decreasing priority, the rule types are: recording rules, general rules, law rules, forced combination rules, combination rules, and continuation rules.
Beginning with the highest priority, the rules are matched 5 to select a rule that can re. If none, then the next lower priority rules are matched, and so on. When a rule res, control returns to highest priority rules. The agenda mechanism can be overriden with the forced combination rules and the continuation rules.
Execution of the program
boole2 is initiated by loading (into working memory and rules) the scienceindependent part of the program, followed by loading the science-dependent part (refer to the Appendix). A set of instances of the simple operations of the science is de ned so that they can be combined. Guided by the control mechanism, the rst applicable combination rule res, which leads to ring other combination, law and control rules. Execution ends after the general rules have produced a de nitive answer to the question of symbolizability, and the recording rules have led the discovered laws.
Recapitulation on the input science in boole2
We now recapitulate the previous subsections in order to provide a uni ed vision of how an input science is represented in boole2, using Logic for illustration.
For Boole and his contemporaries, the theory of Logic was similar. Except for minor di erences, Logic consisted of Aristotelian syllogism and the theory of the conditional. Texts other than Boole's were purely philosophical: they used mostly natural language and, for the sake of a clearer and shorter look, some occasional mathematical symbols, but these symbols lacked algebraic meaning and no mathematical operations involved them (see, for instance, 15] or 9]). In his Mathematical Analysis of Logic, G. Boole did not try to mathematize the whole edi ce of Logic. Instead, he chose one fundamental operation, the act of election, and two ways of combining it, succession and aggregation (see Section 2.2). This is not an oversimpli cation, since the acts of election (the equivalent to predicates in modern terms) and their combinations are su cient to recreate and enlarge classical Logic. This captures essentially the entire content of G. Boole's book. Operations and combinations are the starting point for the reasoning reported in his book, which we therefore model in boole2.
The act of election in Logic is represented in boole2 as a subclass of the prede ned simple-operation frame, and its representation (or notation) re ects the so-called linguistic way of reasoning, which becomes apparent when the notation is used to compute the e ect of combinations. A choice of di erent notations is allowed, to re ect particular deductive strategies that are found in Logic (see Sections 4.1, and 4.2.2).
Two combination-instance frames represent the combinations of Logic, succession and aggregation. Their result-generator functions rely on a sophisticated examination of the English sentences that represent the operations to be combined (Section 4.2).
Some of the heuristics that lead to discovering the algebraic character of Logic are domain independent. However, testing for equality, which is a basic tool in Boole's Logic and is a law rule in boole2, is a science-dependent heuristic. It is implemented as the equal-notation boolean function, and it is the nal step of any logical reasoning that ends in the discovery of a law (see Section 5.1).
Future research
There are two open questions on which we are beginning work, corresponding to the two traditional AI approaches:
Cognitive approach: We intend to consider further sciences as inputs to the system. This approach has a cognitive focus because to use a new science, one must rst represent that science as a suitable input to the system, either by studying how scientists represent the concepts of their eld or by designing a wholly new representation. It would be interesting to match the representations used in speci c sciences against the common representation entailed by the MSS and embedded in boole2. Once the system discovers that a science is symbolizable, that science could be input to a future system that is sketched as follows.
Engineering approach: The goal would be to automate Boole's Logic.
Since Logic is abstractly equivalent to Algebra, it can be manipulated in terms of algebraic properties and reasoning. Therefore, one could build an algebraic reasoning system for proving theorems in Logic. Since there are many potentially symbolizable sciences, as tested by boole2, the same \algebraic theorem prover" could be applied to reason in di erent sciences using the common structure de ned in boole2. For example, proving a theorem in one of those sciences would be equivalent to solving a system of linear equations.
Related work
The main di erence between boole2 and other systems dealing with the discovery of historical laws, such as bacon, glauber, stahl and dalton, 24, 25] 1, pp.46-57] , is that boole2 is exclusively guided by theory, instead of experimentation, i.e., it is not a data-driven discovery system. boole2's input is not experimental data, but an abstract representation of some science. Further, many of its heuristics stem from theory, i.e., from the precise symbolic in which G. Boole reported his discovery of mathematical Logic.
8 Conclusions George Boole's work, as we understand it, bears on four signi cant elds:
From the viewpoint of Scienti c Discovery, Boole's achievement was nding that Logic is symbolizable, and that its symbolic operations belong to the family of operations that obey commutative, distributive and (special) index laws. As concerns the History of Mathematics, we have rst understood the knowledge that G. Boole probably had, and the scienti c and human historical circumstances. This understading has informed our acount of his historic discovery using the same terms and background that he reported. In terms of Cognitive Science, our contribution has focused on human intelligence, seeking to abstract a theory of an intelligent process. Boole applied the method to some truly di cult problems in the Di erential Calculus and the Calculus of Finite Di erences. He seemed convinced that the method was a symbolical calculus applicable not only to other branches of Mathematics, but also to other branches of knowledge, if they had any promise of being based on similar laws. Boole's boldness was to imagine that human thought could be expressed in terms of operators that he called \elective" (since they represent \the act of election of a set of individuals from a universe of discourse"), and to check whether these operators could be combined in laws similar to algebraic laws. It is not by mere chance that he entitled his main logical treatise \The Laws of Thought", and that in his rst public appearance, in an 1835 lecture on Newton, well before he met Gregory, he stated that his aim was to deal with Newton's mind rather than with Newton's biography 2, p.1]. Fourth, in terms of AI, we have found another example of an AI system that resembles how humans work in representing and solving problems. Boole's writings report the use of abstraction and generalization (between Algebra and Logic), goal-driven reasoning, and deduction from a given generalization to \classify" a science as symbolizable. The kind of representation that appears to be used by Boole in the process of discovery is very important: he explained the idea of operation in Logic in a linguistic way, i.e., in terms of natural language sentences. This representation was powerful enough to yield truly general rules. These reasons motivated the use of such representations and methods in our computer programs.
Our main research contributions can be summarized as follows:
We have performed a detailed study of George Boole's discovery of Logic as an algebraic discipline by means of his application of the MSS that, at that time, had been used only within Mathematics.
This study informed our computational model boole2 of the steps recounted by G. Boole in his Logic writings. The science-dependent part of boole2 is a computational representation of the subset of Logic that Boole chose to start his reasoning. The execution of boole2 with Logic as input suggests that the system can proceed from the starting point { the logical de nition of the act of election and the logical rules for combining instances of this act { to the conclusions reached by Boole himself. This shows that the knowledge given to the program su ces for a plausible explanation of how George Boole might have made his discovery and, therefore, that boole2 itself is an approximation to a theory of this scienti c discovery. boole2's methods suggest that the process is general enough to be applied to other sciences, by just entering their initial description. Evidence for this generality is provided by boole2's execution with Gregory's Geometry and a small subset of the Di erential Calculus, which are found symbolizable, and a generalization of Gregory's Geometry, which is not.
other input sciences are available at http://grial.uc3m.es/ dborrajo/boole/.
This initial function loads the science-independent part of the system and the speci c part corresponding to Logic. It also stores in working memory the instances X; Y ; Z of generic simple operations of the science.
----------> Firing production AGGREGATION-1 ****** Making the aggregation of Z and Z.
The input notation is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z)) and ((ALL THAT ARE Z) The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z)) This rule is the rst from the list of rules ready to re. The rules at higher priority levels (recording, general, laws, and forced-combinations) can not yet be matched. This rule aggregates the simple operations Z and Z. To apply the aggregation, the rule rst generates a notation for the two input operations, and then it generates a notation for their aggregation. The notation for an input simple operation is (ALL THAT ARE operation-name), whereas the result notation is the union of the input notations, in which repeated or subsumed notation elements have been removed. Finally, a new simple-operation Z+Z is added to the working memory.
----------> Firing production IDEMPOTENCE ****** Verified the idempotence of the combination AGGREGATION Since the result of aggregating Z and Z is equal to Z, the rule relative to idempotence res.
----------> Firing production AGGREGATION-2 ****** Making the aggregation of X and Z for making succession with Z. The input notation is: ((X THAT ARE Z) (X THAT ARE NOT Z)) and ((ALL THAT ARE Z)) The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z) (X THAT ARE NOT Z))
The system is still at the combination priority level. Control has been transferred to the aggregation-2 rule by the continuation rules. For each combination, there may be more than one rule, corresponding to di erent ways of the intended use of the combination. For the example case of aggregation, there are two di erent ways to generate notations for the input operations. The rst way has appeared before, and this rule corresponds to the second way. This rule is used when boole2 plans to apply succession to the result of the aggregation of two operations, to test distributivity.
----------> Firing production FORCED-AGGREGATION-1 ****** Making the forced aggregation of Z and X.
The input notation is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z)) and ((ALL THAT ARE X)) The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE X) (ALL THAT ARE Z))
Since the system has earlier aggregated X and Z, the heuristic rule FORCED-AGGREGATION-1 matches, and applies the aggregation to Z and X, in order subsequently to test the commutativity of aggregation.
----------> Firing production COMMUTATIVE ****** The commutative holds for the combination AGGREGATION Since the aggregation of X and Z has the same resulting notation as the aggregation of Z and X, aggregation is commutative. Note that checking whether two notations are the same is not trivial step.
----------> Firing production SUCCESSION-1 ****** Making the succession of Z and Z.
The input notations are: Z and ((ALL THAT ARE Z)) The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z)) Succession works like aggregation: it generates input notations, and then applies succession to generate a result notation. The input notations are the operation-name of the rst operation, and (ALL THAT ARE operation-name-2) when the two operations are the same.
----------> Firing production IDEMPOTENCE ****** Verified the idempotence of the combination SUCCESSION Since the result of Z succession Z is Z, the rule for idempotence res for the combination succession.
----------> Firing production SUCCESSION-2 ****** Making the succession of Z and ((ALL THAT ARE Z) (X THAT ARE NOT Z)).
The input notations are: Z and ((ALL THAT ARE Z) (X THAT ARE NOT Z)) The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z)) This rule is similar to SUCCESSION-1 but it need not generate a notation for the second operation since it is just a previous result (instead of one of the operations initially generated) and so a notation already exists for it. boole2 records the laws of LOGIC using its record rules, and then summarizes its work as follows:
The science LOGIC is symbolizable. Its laws are: COMMUTATIVE, with respect to the combination SUCCESSION INDEX IDEMPOTENCE, with respect to the combination SUCCESSION IDEMPOTENCE, with respect to the combination SUCCESSION
